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1. How government grew in wealthy countries 
Throughout the 20
th century most industrialized countries experienced a remarkable 
growth of public expenditure, despite marked differences in their institutional and 
demographic structures.  Up until World War I the size of public spending was relatively 
negligible in most industrialized countries, due perhaps to the laissez-faire outlook that 
prevailed during the 19
th century.  According to Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), the 
average share of public expenditure in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) among 17 
industrialized countries was a mere 12 percent in 1913, only slightly above 11 percent of 
1870.  After World War I, however, government spending escalated rapidly as 
governments took more active roles in economic and social developments, especially so 
in reaction to the Great Depression.  By 1937 the average size of government among 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries grew to 23 
percent of GDP, doubling the 1913 level.   
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Such a trend reached its peak between 1960 and 1980.  Backed by the general 
optimism of government’s ability to correct various market failures and perhaps by naïve 
perceptions of government bureaucrats’ competency and public spiritedness, average 
public expenditure as a share of GDP rose from 28 percent to 43 percent during the 
period, nearly quadrupling the 1870 level.  By 1980 the level of government spending in 
France and Germany approached nearly the half of GDP, while relatively smaller 
governments of Japan, U.K. and U.S. kept their public expenditures well above 30 
percent of GDP.  Interestingly, this growth has considerably slowed down since 1980, 
and in some countries the share of government spending in GDP even declined, a 
phenomenon Tanzi and Schuknecht speculate was caused by the Reagan-Thatcher 
revolution which made voters and taxpayers less sanguine about state actions.  From 
1980 to 1990, for example, the U.K. share of public expenditure in GDP declined from 
43 percent to 40 percent, and similarly so for Belgium, Ireland, New Zealand and the 
Netherlands.  In fact, on average, government spending in all OECD countries rose by 
only 2.5 percentage points from 1980 to 1996 (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000).   
Despite this recent slowdown, the growth of government’s share of GDP over the 
past century is both impressive and unprecedented compared to the previous history of 
public expenditure, inviting numerous scholars to explain this extraordinary 
phenomenon.  We believe that the literature parses the sources of government growth into 
two broad analytic categories- what Holsey and Borcherding (1997) termed “a-
institutional” and “institutional” approaches.  The a-institutional approach focuses on the 
“mechanical” aspects of public expenditure growth, anchored in conventional neo-
classical economic theory.  This paradigm claims that the growth of government’s   3
relative size is a natural consequence of changing social and market conditions.  On the 
other hand, the institutional paradigm is concerned mainly with political modelings of the 
public expenditure growth in the context of rent-seeking activities among voter-
taxpayers, special-interest groups, and government bureaucrats.   
 
2. A-institutional approaches 
On the whole, a-political types of modeling assume that government provision arises due 
to the failure of private market to provide desired levels of a given public service.  
Therefore, determining whose desire is to be served by government becomes a central 
issue, and it is generally presumed that the median voter plays a key role in determining 
the level of government expenditures under majority rule.  The general procedure for 
deriving the demand for public services is then identical to determining the median-
voter’s demand function, which, in turn, depends on the voter preferences, incomes, tax-
price per unit of services, and the price of related private goods and services.  For 
example, Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) modeled 
nonfederal U.S. government expenditure as a function of factors that influence the 
median voter’s demand, such as tax-price, income, and a sharing-economy element 
representing the degree of publicness in consumption of the services provided. 
  On the supply side of this a-institutional analysis, Baumol’s cost disease 
hypothesis features most importantly.  Baumol (1967) argued that because the 
government sector is largely labor intensive, productivity growth rates are likely lower 
there compared to those of private capital-intensive industries, causing the relative price 
of government services to rise over time.  Since demands for public services are rather   4
own-price inelastic, the increase in the relative price of government services implies an 
increase in the real value of government expenditures.  In fact, the steady rise in the 
relative price of government services has been empirically supported by numerous 
studies, including Bradford, Malt, and Oates (1969); Beck (1976); Spann (1977); 
Peltzman (1980); Berry and Lowery (1984); Ferris and West (1996, 1999).  More 
recently, Borcherding, Ferris and Garzoni (2002) found a 0.8 percent average growth rise 
of the price index of government sector output relative to the GDP deflator for private 
output for twenty OECD countries from 1970 to 1997.  In addition, price-inelastic 
demands for government services are now established facts in the public choice literature.  
Early studies by Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) 
indicated price-inelastic demands in the range of -0.25 to -0.50.  These have been 
replicated by subsequent studies by Perkins (1977) and Gramlich (1985).  Not 
surprisingly, the Baumol price effect is now generally accepted by a large majority of 
public choice scholars as a major source of public sector expansion (Lybeck and 
Henrekson, 1988; Ferris and West, 1993).   
  Income rise is another of the conventional elements to explain the growth of 
government.  Over a century ago Adolph Wagner (1893) observed that as a society and 
its economy progress over time, the role of government in fiscal-budgetary matters 
expands both in absolute and relative terms, in what he called “the law of expanding state 
expenditure.”  Empirically, however, most contemporary researchers are unsupportive of 
this idea.  For “Wagner’s law” to be valid income elasticities for the public expenditures 
must be greater than the unity.  Although Peltzman (1980) claimed that the standard 
estimating technique resulted in downwardly biased estimates, most empirical studies   5
have estimated income elasticities to be much less than the unity, mostly in the range of 
0.5 to 0.75, rejecting Wagner’s law even after using refined estimating techniques to 
adjust for biases previously noted (Mueller, 1989; Ram, 1987; Gemmell, 1990; 
Henrekson, 1990). 
Population enters into the median-voter’s demand function via the offsetting 
effects of joint consumption economies and median voter tax-share reductions.  Taking 
price-elasticity as zero, and given constant marginal cost of providing public goods and 
services, a larger population implies less government spending as a share of GDP, since 
publicly provided goods are shared amongst more people.  On the other hand, this sharing 
aspect effectively reduces tax-price per unit of the government services to the median 
voter, thus increasing the quantities demanded since demands are not totally price 
inelastic.  Borcherding (1985) demonstrated that the net effect of population change 
depends on both the degree of publicness of the service (not much) provided and the 
price elasticity of given government services (also low).  He found that on the whole the 
two effects cancel each other out.  This finding is consistent with the Peltzman’s study 
(Peltzman, 1980) which yielded an elasticity coefficient for population on per capita 
government spending not significantly different from zero.  A recent study by 
Borcherding, Ferris, and Garzoni (2002) again found no significant relationship between 
population change and government’s relative size. 
 
3. Institutional approaches 
  According to Borcherding (1985) and Borcherding, Ferris, and Garzoni (2002), 
determinants based on traditional economic theories explain no more than fifty percent of   6
public expenditure growth, and likely less.  To complete the missing pieces of the puzzle, 
public choice economists have turned to neoinstitutional modelings of the growth of 
government size.  Unlike the conventional method with emphasis on productive, 
community-service aspect of government services, this political approach typically 
assumes that government is a vehicle for various sorts of interest groups to promote 
income redistribution in their own favor, depending on their sizes and relative powers.  In 
this neoinstitutional view of complicated processes of political competition, more 
powerful coalitions win redistributional gains at the expense of less politically favored 
groups.  As the ownership structure of political influence asymmetrically alters, more 
redistribution takes place and the size of public expenditure increases. 
  Although many factors affect this redistributional activity, the rules and 
procedures of the voting process that determine collective choices are crucial.  Stigler's 
“Director’s law” (1970) hypothesized that the major beneficiary of public expenditures in 
democracies is the middle-class, since its financing burdens the various income classes 
differentially.  In the 19th century, Stigler notes, taxes were not tied to personal incomes, 
nor were benefits of public spending closely tailored to particular beneficiary groups.  
Instead, federal revenues came largely from tariffs and excise taxes.  These severe 
restrictions on tax discrimination and the targeting of federal expenditures to fairly 
general-interest projects severely limited the redistributive role of government.  Although 
state and local government grew slightly in relative size from 1870 until 1910, the federal 
share of U.S. public expenditures actually fell a bit (Borcherding, 1985).  As restraints on 
tax discrimination and limitation on federal expenditures were relaxed in the 20th 
century- e.g., federal personal and corporate income taxes were introduced in the wake of   7
the 16
th amendment of 1913- taxes and expenditures became more closely tied to income 
class, enabling the middle class, the putative majority coalition, to seek more 
redistribution through subsidies and transfer spending.  Thus, a larger federal government 
budget materialized (Stigler, 1970).  In fact, Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) point out that 
changes in transfer and subsidies explain most of the growth in the U.S. public 
expenditures during the period of 1960 and 1990, as well as for the other wealthy OECD 
countries.  
  Building upon the Director’s law, Meltzer and Richard (1981, 1983) developed a 
rent-seeking model based on income classes in the context of the median-voter paradigm.  
They assume that public services serve redistributive ends and note the skew of income 
distribution towards the wealthy, since mean income necessarily exceeds that of the 
median.  Given this bias, the median voter (who by hypothesis is the median income 
earner) sets the effective tax rates and determines the redistributive outcomes.  Voters 
with incomes less than the median’s also favor more income redistribution, providing the 
necessary majority support for government expenditure growth.  The key prediction of 
this Director’s law model is that the increase in indicators of income inequality (e.g., an 
increase in the ratio of mean to median income) leads to greater redistribution, hence 
greater size of government.   
Two examples of such structural changes which enhance these rent-seeking fiscal 
effects were the extension of suffrage to lower income families in the late 19th and 
throughout the 20th centuries, and the effects of social security system on the number of 
retired persons (Meltzer and Richard, 1981).  Using U.S. time-series data and 
econometric estimation techniques, Meltzer and Richard (1983) discovered a statistically   8
significant positive relationship between government spending and the ratio of mean to 
median income.  Nevertheless, subsequent studies of this phenomenon for other countries 
have yielded mixed results.  For example, using a pooled cross-sectional time-series data 
for many industrialized countries, Kristov, Lindert and McCelland (1992) show a 
negative correlation between government expenditures and income inequality. 
  Peltzman (1980) also has modeled redistributive rent seeking by income-based 
coalitions which focuses upon the vote-gathering and coalition-forming processes.  While 
differences among groups promote redistributive rent-seeking, effectiveness of these 
activities depends on the transaction costs and returns of forming effective coalitions and 
preventing the formation of blocking ones.  Peltzman’s model recognizes that, along with 
between-group inequality, within-group equality tends to increase the level of 
redistribution implying greater sized government.  As incomes are more evenly 
distributed within potential beneficiary classes, the transaction costs of forming 
successful coalitions fall, making redistributive efforts more effective.  His study 
concluded that the growth of government in the post-World War II period can be 
attributed mostly to the growth of a more homogeneous middle class, which gave 
differential advantage to this group over the rich and poor, strengthening both the 
theoretical and empirical case for Director’s law.   
  Several other scholars also appealed to competition among pressure groups to 
influence fiscal processes for political favor as of explanatory importance.  Unlike 
Stigler’s and Peltzman’s income-class approaches to redistribution where the majority 
systematically manipulates the minority through the democratic process, interest group 
theories are driven by the assumed lower organization costs of smaller, more   9
homogeneous groups organized on non-class bases and the ability of these to exploit 
larger, less-cohesive citizen groups.  In general, such theories imply that (1) 
specialization and increased division of labor accompanied by economic development 
increase the numbers of powerful interest groups (Demsetz, 1982; North and Wallis, 
1982, 1986), and (2) these larger numbers of interest groups tend to increase the size of 
government spending (Demsetz, 1982; Olson, 1982).  Recently, more theoretical 
attention has been given to incorporating electoral politics and interest groups into fiscal 
choice.  Becker (1983, 1985) developed a pressure group influence function, which 
depends on time and money spent on rent-seeking effort, as well as the degree of free 
riding due to increasing group size.  In the Becker model the main determinant of the 
relative strength of interest-group pressure is the efficiency, or its negative complement- 
deadweight cost, of the tax system.  He concludes that more efficient tax systems actually 
lower general taxpayer-voter influence relative to the pressure of the competing subsidy 
recipient group, thus increasing budget size.  More recently, Becker and Mulligan (1998) 
have demonstrated empirically that there is a positive correlation between tax system 
efficiency and the size of government.  The preliminary work of Dušek (2002) for the 
U.S. from 1940 to 1970 confirms this.  Generally speaking, these findings imply that the 
introduction of value-added type taxes in the 1970s in all OECD countries, but the U.S., 
contributed importantly to the growth of public spending.  Perhaps this explains why its 
adoption is so fiercely resisted in the U.S. (Holsey and Borcherding, 1997). 
  Another important strand of the budget growth literature claims that government 
growth may be the result of rent-seeking activities of government bureaucrats.  Just as 
income-based coalitions in the models of Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Peltzman   10
(1980) seek redistributional gain at the expense of others, interest groups in the Becker 
(1983, 1985) framework spend resources to enhance their political influences for the 
same purpose.  Clearly, government bureaucrats and public employee unions are also 
motivated to transfer the wealth of general taxpaying public in their favor.  Niskanen’s 
budget-maximizing theory states that government bureaucrats are hardly benevolent 
promoters of the public weal, but, instead, are rational rent seekers with a desire for larger 
budgets.  Because bureaucrats are principally motivated by “power, pay and prestige” and 
possess some monopoly power over the supply of public services, the budget is likely to 
be pushed beyond the median voter’s ideal level (Niskanen, 1971).  Romer and Rosenthal 
(1978, 1979) operationalized this theory by proposing the notion of a “budget reversion 
point.”  The budget is expanded when monopolistic bureaucrats offer an alternative 
budget so small that the larger, bureaucratically preferred budget is chosen.  In an 
empirical study, Borcherding, Bush and Spann (1977) also confirm the Niskanen 
conjecture by scrutinizing the hypothesis that the existence of civil service regulations 
caused higher levels of spending in state and local governments.  They found that within 
the U.S., non-federal per capita public expenditures were positively correlated with the 
length of time civil service regulations were in effect.    
These bureaucracy models were further developed by Brennan and Buchanan 
(1977) in their Leviathan theory, which added limits of various sorts on the Tiebout 
(1956) effects of citizen mobility and inter-jurisdictional competition to the framework of 
budget-maximizing bureaucrats.  The Leviathan approach reasons that greater 
centralization over time has increased government’s monopoly power, since voters have 
fewer locational choices than in decades past.  With less competition from other districts,   11
government is more able to inflate its budget without seriously risking the loss of taxable 
income bases or other revenue sources (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977, 1978, 1980).  
Although empirical studies of the Leviathan theory have produced mixed results, the 
centralization hypothesis seems to work well as an explanation of greater nonfederal 
public spending in the U.S., particularly with respect to local governments where citizen 
mobility is otherwise less restricted (Oates, 1989).   
An increased level of fiscal illusion is yet another neoinstitutional force for 
explaining the relative growth of government.  This theory basically holds that taxpayers 
systematically underestimate their tax burdens, while self-interested bureaucrats pursue 
more than the median voter’s ideal level of public expenditures.  Such illusions come in a 
variety of forms, such as “(1) complexity of tax structure, (2) renter illusion respect to 
property taxation, (3) income elasticity of tax structure, (4) debt illusion, and (5) the 
flypaper effect (Oates, 1988, 60).”  While empirical studies of the fiscal illusion 
hypothesis generally have resulted in mixed results, renter’s illusion (renters incorrectly 
believe that landlords pay property taxes) and flypaper effect (voters erroneously 
perceive lump-sum grants as lowering marginal tax price) have received wide empirical 
support.  The fiscal illusion literature, however, does not explicitly model who 
manipulates and reaps the benefits of voter misperceptions (Mueller, 1989).  While we 
suppose that Niskanen bureaucrats could be in the position of utilizing taxpayer 
misperceptions, neither income-based coalitions nor special interest groups can be readily 
overlooked as they are also, by hypothesis, able to influence the bureaucrats through 
electoral politics and political pressures.     12
Additionally, in spite of their theoretical and empirical underdevelopments, 
several alternative theories of government growth are also worth mentioning: (1) 
changing ideologies and social preferences (North, 1985a; Lindback, 1985); (2) reduced 
community inputs, including diminished social capital (Hamilton, 1982; Schwab and 
Zampelli, 1987); (3) increased household production costs (North, 1985a; Breton, 1989); 
and (4) rising transaction costs (North, 1984, 1985 a, 1985 b; North and Wallis, 1982, 
1986).  These theories argue that government expenditures grew over time because 
citizen-consumers set higher priority on publicly provided services relative to private 
market services; lower levels of community resources increased the median voter’s tax-
price; increased geographic mobility and the participation of women in the labor force 
greatly increased household costs of providing the typical family services; and greater 
specialization and division of labor increased the transaction costs of market exchange.  
Interestingly, these hypotheses are concerned with changes in socioeconomic 
environments and their effects on demands for government services.  Empirical evidence 
for these approaches is decidedly suggestive. 
 
4. Concluding thoughts 
While economic theories of government growth focus upon the median voter 
model, institutional approaches span a wider range of frameworks, adding more social 
and realpolitik factors missing in the neoclassical analysis.  Less generally recognized, 
however, is that the conventional budgetary measure of government size becomes a less 
useful indicator of the magnitude of government’s influence over the economy as 
regulation, the alternative political instrument to fiscal activity, increases (Posner, 1971).    13
This means that the true size of government should also incorporate an estimate of the 
spending equivalent necessary to obtain private sector compliance with public sector 
regulatory rules and directives.  Without properly accounting for this “quiet side” of 
government activity (Leonard, 1986), public expenditures will significantly 
underestimate the full impact of government on the overall economy.  Leonard (1986) 
finds several sources of budget understatement: promises of retirement benefits and 
social insurance, tax expenditures, subsidies in sale of public activities to favored groups, 
and, of course, regulatory impositions of government on the private sector.  In the recent 
study of government growth of twenty OECD countries in the post-1970 period, 
Borcherding, Ferris and Garzoni (2002) used two measures of the degree of regulation to 
show that relatively more regulation is positively correlated with the size of public 
expenditures, suggesting that regulation and government spending are complements 
rather than substitutes for one another.  They also show that although regulation adds to 
the relative size of U.S. government, it does not seem to increase the rate of growth in the 
post-1980 period, since the ratio of regulation costs to fiscal spending was roughly 
constant.  It will be interesting to discover whether this holds generally for the other 
OECD countries.  
  Finally, our survey focused wholly on the growth of spending in wealthy 
countries.  If we were to look at the developing world, we would find that government 
spending shares were much smaller than for the richer countries (by 10 to 20 percentage 
points).  We also believe that the unmeasured regulatory sector would be vastly 
understated.  Again, this illustrates the desirability of developing accurate measures of the 
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